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Abstract 
The paper investigates the impact of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) subsidies on farm 
total factor productivity (TFP) in the European Union (EU). We employ a structural semi-
parametric estimation algorithm directly incorporating the effect of subsidies into a model of 
unobserved productivity. We empirically study the effects using the Farm Accountancy Data 
Network (FADN) samples for the EU-15 countries. Our main findings are clear: subsidies impact 
negatively farm productivity in the period before the decoupling reform was implemented; after 
decoupling the effect of subsidies on productivity is more nuanced and in several countries it 
turned positive. 
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1 Introduction 
Annually, EU spends around €50 billion on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) with the 
primary goal to support farmers’ income and improve the environmental impact of agricultural 
production. The majority of CAP subsidies are disbursed in the form of decoupled direct 
payments from the EU budget which are not linked to current and future quantities of agricultural 
production. Within the CAP there are also subsidies which are coupled to the production of 
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specific crop or animal commodities or allocated for rural development projects. Various studies 
have shown that these CAP subsidies impact on the farm sector productivity.  
There are two competing policy relevant arguments regarding the impact of agricultural 
subsidies on productivity. On the one hand, in the context of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) trade liberalization agenda, the discussion centres on the distortionary impact of subsidies 
on agricultural markets (including on productivity) and how the effects differ between different 
types of subsidies. Following the WTO agreements, many countries decoupled their agricultural 
subsidies with the aim of reducing distortionary agricultural support (Meléndez-Ortíz et al., 
2009).
2,3
 On the other hand, recent developments in world markets leading to increasing volatility 
of global food commodity prices and rising food security concerns, especially in developing 
countries, have led to calls for maintaining agricultural support, stimulating farm investment and 
the adoption of productivity enhancing modern technology (FAO, 2011). The European 
Commission explicitly mentions in its proposal for the post-2013 CAP the challenge of food 
security and the EU’s goal to support long-term food supply potential and meet the growing 
world food demand(European Commission, 2010; 2011). 
The impact of subsidies on agricultural production, input allocation and income 
distribution is well documented in the literature (e.g., Alston and James, 2002; Ridier and Jacquet, 
2002; Lagerkvist, 2005; Goodwin and Mishra, 2006; Serraet al., 2006; Sckokai and Moro, 2009; 
Vercammen, 2007; Féménia et al., 2010; Carpentier et al., 2012; Weber and Key, 2012), but 
significantly less attention has been devoted to the impacts of subsidies on productivity of farms. 
Theoretical studies suggest that subsidies may have positive impact on farm production and at the 
same time negative impact on farm productivity (Hennessy, 1998; Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009). 
However, these studies are inconclusive in predicting the exact relationship between agricultural 
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subsidies and productivity while the empirical literature finds mixed effects. The existing 
empirical studies usually employ a two stage approach whereby productivity measures are 
estimated in the first stage without controlling for subsidy effects and then these productivity 
measures are regressed on subsidies in the second stage(e.g., Giannakas et al., 2001; Latruffe et 
al.,2009; Lakner, 2009; Sauer and Park, 2009; Zhu and Oude Lansink, 2010; Mary 2012); 
Kumbhakar and Bokusheva(2009) and Latruffe et al. (2011) are exceptions. The disadvantage of 
the two stage approach is that it does not incorporate subsidies explicitly into a structural 
estimation algorithm and thus cannot capture their full effect on productivity. The two-stage 
approach therefore may lead to biased estimates of the overall impact of subsidies on productivity. 
We aim to fill this gap in the literature by investigating the impact of CAP subsidies on 
(aggregate) farm productivity using a structural productivity estimation approach based on Olley 
and Pakes (1996).We explicitly model the unobserved productivity and directly incorporate the 
effects of subsidies into a structural semi-parametric estimation procedure.We apply the 
procedure to the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) dataset and estimate total factor 
productivity (TFP)
4
 for large and representative samples of farms in each of the EU-15 countries 
over the period 1990-2008.Furthermore, special attention is paid to the significant change of 
regime with decoupling of subsidies by the 2003 CAP reform. The paper compares the impact of 
subsidies on farm productivity before and after decoupling. We find that subsidies are negatively 
associated with productivity until the implementation of the decoupling reform. After this reform 
the link between subsidies and farm productivity became more nuanced as in several EU-15 
countries it turned positive. From a policy perspective the finding is important at least in the EU 
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context, especially following the recent European Commission proposals that the EU subsidy 
system is likely to continue after 2013.  
The paper is organised as follows. Next, we review the relevant theoretical and empirical 
literature and motivate our empirical approach. In section 3 we present our estimation algorithm. 
In section 4 we describe the FADN data and report production function estimation results. In 
section 5 we verify the link between subsidies and farm productivity by the means of correlation 
analysis. Section 6 summarises our findings and concludes.  
 
2 Subsidies and productivity: Findings inthe literature 
Theoretical studies show that there are various channels through which subsidies impact 
(aggregate) productivity (De Long and Summers, 1991; Blomstrom et al., 1996; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998). Subsidies may either increase or decrease productivity and thus the net effect 
may be either positive or negative. The negative impact of subsidies on productivity may result 
from allocative and technical efficiency losses due to distortions in production structure and 
factor use, soft budget constraints and the shift of subsidies to less productive enterprises. The 
positive impact of subsidies may be due to investment-induced productivity gains caused by 
interactions of credit and risk attitudes with subsidies (subsidy-induced credit access, lower cost 
of borrowing, reduction in risk aversion, increase in productive investment). 
Subsidies may negatively affect farm productivity because they distort the production 
structure of recipient farms leading to allocative inefficiency. Recipient farms may modify their 
behaviour and start investing in subsidy seeking activities which are relatively less productive 
(Baumol, 1990; Alston and James, 2002). Allocative inefficiency may also be a result of 
distortions in input use. Subsidies give recipient farms an incentive to change their capital-labour 
ratio which can lead to allocative inefficiency, i.e., over-investment in subsidised inputs. 
Subsidisation may also give rise to technical inefficiency if they are captured by the farms as 
higher profits leading to slack, lack of effort and competitive pressures to seek cost-improving 
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methods (Leibenstein, 1966). Similarly, Kornai (1986) argues that subsidisation might give rise 
to soft budget constraints which would lead to inefficient use of resources. If the budget 
constraint is hard the farm will continuously adjust to (unfavourable) external conditions by 
behaving in an entrepreneurial manner. If the budget constraint is soft, productive efforts are no 
longer imperative; the subsidy provider acts like an insurer taking over the moral hazard while 
the insured (recipient farms) are less careful in protecting their wealth. Finally, subsidies may end 
up being transferred to less productive farms by policy makers “with special interest”, or as Olson 
(1982) asserts, subsidies may reduce the rate at which resources are reallocated from one activity 
to another in response to new technologies or market conditions. 
The literature on credit constraints and risk behaviour in agriculture (e.g., Blancard et al., 
2006; Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009; Kumbhakar and Bokusheva, 2009; Hüttel et al., 2010) asserts a 
positive relationship between subsidies and productivity. If farms are credit rationed, then 
subsidies may provide an additional source of finance either directly by increasing farms’ 
financial resources or indirectly through the improved access to formal credit. In other words, for 
credit rationed farms subsidies may serve as a substitute for credit. Studies find that credit 
constraint farms invest less and have lower allocative and technical efficiency which would 
improve as a result of subsidies (Feder,1985; Feder et al., 1990, and more recently Blancard et al., 
2006; Kumbhakar and Bokusheva, 2009; Hüttel et al., 2010). Cheaper credit would stimulate 
investments and input use thus leading to improved farm performance. Credit unconstrained 
farms may also be affected, if subsidies present a cheaper source of financing than the credit 
available from the financial markets. Furthermore, Hennessy (1998) suggests that under 
uncertainty subsidies affect markets through a wealth effect; subsidies affect farmers’ wealth and 
thus their risk attitudes. For example, farmers may be more willing to expand production with 
certain type of activities or employ additional factors which would otherwise be viewed as too 
risky (Roche and McQuinn, 2004).  
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The negative effect of subsidies (allocative and technical efficiency loss) is likely 
negatively correlated with decoupling, whilst the positive effect (investment-induced productivity 
gain) is likely positively correlated. Consequently, we expect that coupled subsidies will have a 
smaller positive or a larger negative impact on productivity relative to decoupled subsidies. First, 
the efficiency loss is likely to be stronger for coupled subsidies than for decoupled ones because 
farm eligibility for coupled payments is directly linked to farm factor and production decisions, 
and thus are likely to lead to distortions in input and/or output allocation. Coupled subsidies may 
motivate farmers to expand subsidised activities at the expense of otherwise more productive 
activities. For the decoupled subsidies the link to farm activities is weaker. Farms receive CAP 
decoupled subsidies irrespective of their production decisions, so the subsidies are less likely to 
induce allocative and technical inefficiency effects(Floyd, 1965; Dewbre et al., 2001; Alston and 
James, 2002; Guyomard et al., 2004; Courleux, et al., 2008).
5
Second, the investment-induced 
productivity gain through the credit and risk channels is likely smaller for coupled than for 
decoupled payments (e.g., Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009; Hennessy, 1998). The conditionality of 
coupled subsidies increases monitoring costs of financial institutions if subsidies are used by 
credit constrained farms as collateral for investment loans. Financial institutions have to check 
what farms produce to learn about their future eligibility for coupled subsidies. For decoupled 
payments, the certainty of payments is higher due to their link to land assets which are relatively 
costless to monitor and less a subject to production risk. Thus decoupled payments are more 
suitable as collateral to financial institutions (Barry and Robinson, 2001; Ciaian et al., 2012). 
Findings in the empirical literature are mixed and inconclusive although negative relations 
between CAP (coupled) subsidies and various measures of productivity tend to prevail. In general, 
studies focus on the effects of coupled subsidies in narrowly defined agricultural sectors. Latruffe 
et al. (2009) find a negative impact of coupled CAP subsidies on managerial efficiency of French 
farms specialised in cereals, oilseeds and beef production. Lakner (2009) shows that the agri-
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environmental payments and investment programmes have negative effects on the technical 
efficiency of organic dairy farms in Germany. Estimates of Zhu and Oude Lansink (2010) 
indicate that negative technical efficiency effects of coupled subsidies prevail for crop farms in 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Similarly, Zhu et al. (2012) find that both output-related 
and input-related CAP subsidies have negative impact on dairy farm technical efficiency in 
Germany and the Netherlands between 1995 and 2004, but no significant impact in Sweden. 
Their results also imply that a higher degree of coupling in farm support negatively affects farm 
efficiency. Latruffe et al. (2011) report a negative impact of total subsidies on dairy farms’ 
technical efficiency in seven EU countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Spain, the 
Netherlands, and the UK) during the period 1990-2007. Latruffe et al. (2011) also study the first 
years of decoupled payments and their results indicate that in all countries, except Denmark, the 
average technical efficiency surprisingly was lower after decoupling.  
In contrast, Sauer and Park (2009) find a positive influence of organic subsidies on TFP 
change (technical efficiency change and technological change) for organic dairy farms in 
Denmark during the period 2002-2004. Yee et al. (2004) also find positive relation between TFP 
of US farms and subsidies but of somewhat different kind – the public expenditure on investment 
in research, extension and infrastructure. Mary (2012) estimates the impact of various types of 
CAP subsidies on French crop farms’ TFP during the period 1996-2003. The coupled CAP 
payments (i.e., set-aside premiums, Less Favoured Area (LFA) payments, and livestock subsidies) 
are found to have a negative impact on TFP. In contrast, targeted coupled subsidies which are not 
automatic but subject to project approval, such as investment and agri-environmental measures, 
are found to have no significant impact on TFP. Furthermore, Mary (2012) finds that the Agenda 
2000 reform (i.e., partial decoupling) had a positive impact on aggregate productivity.  
 
3 Estimation strategy: Linking productivity and subsidies 
3.1 Behavioural framework 
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Our strategy for estimating productivity is built on the Olley and Pakes (1996) approach which 
entails modelling unobserved productivity (TFP) while directly controlling for the effects of 
subsidies in the estimation algorithm.
6
 The strength of the approach lies in its flexibility in 
accommodating the specificities of the economic problem of interest and its efficiency in dealing 
with estimation biases. First, it allows us to control for the classic simultaneity bias (Marshak and 
Andrews, 1944) when estimating production functions, without having to rely on instruments. 
This is important as we do not have good instruments available. The second advantage is that we 
can control for potential selection bias due to non-random exits.  
We extend the Olley and Pakes (1996) algorithm by explicitly allowing farm decisions 
and market environment (factor markets and demand conditions) to be affected by the CAP 
subsidies which we directly introduce into the underlying structural model of the farm. The single 
period profit function of farm, j at time, t is ),,(),,,( jtjtjtjtjtjtjt esicesk

 , where kjt, and ωjt are 
the logs of farm’s state variables, capital (including land) and (unobserved) productivity 
respectively, while ijt is the log of farm’s investment. Both restricted profit, π(.) and adjustment 
cost, c(.) depend also on farm subsidies sjt and jte

which represents the economic environment 
that farms face at a particular point in time; jte

 captures effects of input prices, demand 
conditions and industry characteristics. As in Olley and Pakes (1996) all these factors are 
assumed to change over time as some factors are also farm specific. 
The incumbent farm maximizes its expected value of both current and future profits 
according to: 
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The Bellman equation explicitly considers two farm decisions. First is the exit decision; 
),,,( jtjtjtjt esk

  represents the sale value of the farm. Second is the investment decision ijt, 
which solves the interior maximization problem. Under the assumption that equilibrium exists 
and that the difference in profits between the farm continuing and exiting is increasing in ωjt we 
can write the optimal decision rule of a farm to remain in production as  


 

otherwise
eskif jtjtjttjt
jt
0
),,(1


        (2) 
and the investment demand function as 
),,,( jtjtjtjttjt eskii

 .         (3) 
The threshold function t (.) as well as it(.) is determined as part of the Markov perfect Nash 
equilibrium in decisions (Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Olley and Pakes, 1996) and depends on the 
state variables and the characteristics of the economic environment, including subsidies and 
factor prices. In the context of the CAP, farm capital stock might be related to the level of 
subsidies received which may result in higher or lower capital intensity (capital/labour ratio). By 
incorporating the subsidies information into the investment demand and exit rule explicitly, we 
can better control for differences in market conditions than when only controlling through the 
capital stock. Conditional on staying in production the farm has to decide about its inputs, labour 
(l) and materials (m) use and investment (i). Investment determines the capital stock at the 
beginning of each period. The law of capital accumulation is given by kjt = (1−δ)kjt-1 +ijt-1, where 
δ is depreciation rate of capital.  
As in Olley and Pakes (1996) we assume that investment is monotonically increasing in 
productivity conditioned on the level of subsidies received.
7
 Pakes (1994) discusses the 
conditions under which the investment demand function is strictly monotonic in ωjt. Abel and 
Eberly (1994) and several related papers, in a slightly different context, extend the analysis of 
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monotonicity of investment and disinvestment regarding firm fundamentals and show that 
monotonicity breaks only at zero investment values.
8
 Recently Hüttel et al. (2010) apply this 
result to investment analysis of the German farm. Given monotonicity, investment can be 
inverted to generate the productivity function  
),,,( jtjtjtjttjt eskih

 .         (4) 
Furthermore, as in Olley and Pakes (1996) productivity is assumed to evolve according to 
a first-order Markov process with transition probability )|( 1jtjtp   and to be determined by a set 
of distributions conditional on the information at time t which includes past (realised) 
productivity shocks. Given this distribution set, both the exit and investment decision will 
crucially hinge upon farm’s perception of the distribution of the future market structure given 
current information (past productivity). The decisions that farms take will in turn generate a 
distribution for the future market structure (Maskin and Tirole, 1988). 
 
3.2 Estimation algorithm 
Our estimation algorithm is similar to the one in Olley and Pakes (1996) except for the fact that 
the first stage estimation and the survival equation include the subsidy variable and additional 
economic environment controls (similar to Rizov and Walsh, 2009 and 2011).
9
In this way we 
have introduced subsidies as an additional control in the state space of the dynamic program of 
the farm. The production function we estimate is specified as 
jtjtjtkjtljtmjt vklmy  0 ,       (5) 
where yjt is a log of gross real output and νjt is a random error term with a zero mean.  
Substituting the productivity (inverted investment demand) function (4) into the 
production function (5) gives us:  
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 The market environment control vector 
jie

 includes farm specialisation, location information at NUTS3 
(Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) level and a time trend, capturing technology and price effects. 
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jtjtjtjtjttjtkjtljtmjt eskihklmy   ),,,(0

.     (6) 
In Equation (6) as in Olley and Pakes (1996) the productivity function ht(.) is treated non-
parametrically using a polynomial. The non-parametric treatment, however, results in collinearity 
and requires ht(.), kjt, and the constant to be combined into a function ),,,( jtjtjtjtt eski

  such that 
Equation (5) becomes 
jtjtjtjtjttjtljtmjt eskilmy   ),,,(

,      (7) 
which forms the first stage of our estimation algorithm and is estimated using OLS. In Equation 
(7) subsidies are allowed to interact with the terms of the polynomial in capital and investment.
10
 
In the first stage of the estimation algorithm we can only identify materials and labour 
coefficients while the capital coefficient has to be identified in the second stage. As in Olley and 
Pakes (1996) farm labour is treated as a variable and non-dynamic input, which is a function of 
the state variables including subsidies and for which decisions are always made during the current 
period – an assumption introducing additional variation in the labour demand (Ackerberg et al., 
2007). Materials are also treated as fully variable and non-dynamic input on which decisions are 
always made after labour is chosen and given the contemporaneous realisation of 
productivity.
11
In the first stage we also estimate tˆ which allows us to express ωjt for use in the 
second stage as 
jtkjtjt k  0
ˆˆ .          (8) 
Note that the first stage is not affected by endogenous selection because t  fully controls for the 
unobserved productivity, while by construction, 
jt represents unobserved factors that are not 
known by the farmer before investment and exit decisions are made. In contrast, the second stage 
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of the estimation algorithm might be affected by endogenous selection because the exit decision 
in period t depends directly on ωjt.  
To clarify the timing of production decisions and their impact on the selection bias we 
decompose jt  into its conditional expectation given current information (past productivity) and 
a residual: jtjtjtjtjtjt gE    )(]|[ 11 . By construction jt  is uncorrelated with 
information in t-1 and thus with kjt which is chosen prior to time t. Note that the farm’s exit 
decision in period t depends directly on jt  and thus the exit decision will be correlated with jt . 
This correlation relies on the assumption that farms exit production quickly, in the same period 
when the decision is made. If exit is decided in the period preceding actual exit, then even though 
there is a selection per se, exit would be uncorrelated with 
jt . To account for endogenous 
selection on productivity we extend the g(.) function as in Olley and Pakes (1996): 
jtjtjtjt Pg    )
ˆ,(' 1 ,         (9) 
where 
jtPˆ  is the estimated survival propensity score which controls for the impact of selection on 
the expectation of jt , i.e., there is a trade-off such that farms with lower survival probabilities 
which do in fact survive to time t likely have higher 1jt  than those with higher survival 
probabilities. We estimate 
jtPˆ  non-parametrically using a Probit model with a polynomial 
approximation. Note that we condition farm exit on the state variable set extended again with 
information on subsidies and the economic environment.
12
 
The capital coefficient is identified in the second stage of our estimation algorithm. 
Substituting equations (9) and (8) into equation (5) gives us 
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,),ˆ(' 11 jtjtjtkjtjtkjtljtmjt Pkgklmy   

     (10) 
where the two 0  terms are encompassed into the non-parametric function, g’(.) and jt  is a 
composite error term comprised of 
jt  and jt . The lagged 1
ˆ
jt  variable is obtained from the 
first stage estimates at thet-1 period. Because the conditional expectation of jt  given current 
information depends on 1jt , we need to use estimates of ˆ  from thet-1 period. Equation (10) 
is estimated by a non-linear least squares (NLLS) search routine approximating g’(.) with a 
polynomial.
13
 
Similar to Olley and Pakes (1996) we use the estimated (consistent) production function 
coefficients to obtain unbiased farm-specific, time-varying total factor productivity (tfp) measures 
as residuals from the production function:  
)ˆˆˆexp( jtkjtljtmjtjt klmytfp   .       (11) 
Clearly, the two-stage estimation algorithm has an impact on the estimated production 
function coefficients. Compared to OLS estimator we expect materials and labour coefficients to 
be lower since materials and labour demands are strongly positively correlated with the 
productivity shock. The direction of the bias in the capital coefficient is less clear since it impacts 
both through the selection equation and directly, through the productivity shock. However, the 
variation in the capital stock that is attributed to the variation in output – purified from the 
variation in materials and labour – is now conditioned on the subsidy level received by the farm 
and (other) economic environment controls. Due to positive correlation between regional 
productivity and the subsidy level, farms receiving higher per unit of labour subsidy – on average 
– obtain higher output level which, indirectly, through the credit channel may lead to higher 
                                                          
13
 Woodridge (2009) presents a concise, one-stage formulation of the original Olley and Pakes (1996) algorithm 
using GMM estimator which is more efficient but less flexible than the standard Olley-Pakes methodology. 
14 
 
capital intensity.
14
 If farms are credit rationed, then subsidies may substitute for missing credit 
and thus stimulate capital investments (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009; Kumbhakar and Bokusheva, 
2009; Hüttel et al., 2010) leading to a positive relationship between productivity, subsidy level 
and capital intensity. Therefore in order to recover the correct estimates of the production 
function, it is important to control for the effect of subsidies that works both through the 
instantaneous productivity shock impacting materials and labour demand and over time through 
the capital accumulation process. Thus, the resulting tfp measures are obtained while controlling 
for the fact that market conditions are different and evolve differently given the level and nature 
of subsidies received by farms.
15
 
 
4 Data and productivity estimates 
We apply our estimation algorithm to the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) country 
samples, which are compiled and maintained by the European Commission. FADN is a European 
system of sample surveys that take place each year and collect detailed structural and 
accountancy data on the EU farms. In total there is information about 150 variables on farm 
structure, yields, outputs, inputs, costs, incomes, subsidies and taxes, and various other financial 
variables. FADN is the only source of micro-economic data that is harmonised as the accounting 
principles are the same across all EU Member States. FADN is representative of the commercial 
agricultural holdings in the whole of the EU(EU DG-AGRI, 2010). Holdings are selected to take 
part in the surveys on the basis of sampling frames established at the level of each region in the 
EU. The yearly FADN samples cover approximately 80,000 farms and about 90 percent of the 
utilised agricultural land in the EU-27. 
                                                          
14
CAP subsidies are not assigned randomly to farms but depend on regional productivity levels. Farms located in 
more productive regions receive higher subsidies than farms located in less productive regions. Historically, this is 
related to the coupled subsidies as their value was determined by regional yields and animal heard sizes. With the 
2003 CAP reform, coupled subsidies were decoupled from production but the regional variation in subsidies was 
largely preserved (Ackrill, 2000; European Commission, 2012).  
15
 More highly subsidised farms might experience faster technological change. Therefore, we check whether 
technological change is affected by the level of subsidies by interacting time trend with subsidies, in addition to the 
fully interacted polynomial. The results are not different from the reported in the paper.  
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The panel we employ in the study covers the period 1990-2008 and includes the 
commercial farms defined as in Sckokai and Moro (2009) in all EU-15 countries.
16
 Our goal is to 
estimate unbiased and consistent total factor productivity (TFP) measures at farm level, within six 
(FADN) farm-type samples, for each country, and to document the aggregate productivity levels 
and changes over time and by farm type.
17
Furthermore, our ultimate goal is to estimate the link 
between CAP subsidies and farm TFP. The strategy of our empirical analysis implies that we run 
regressions within the six farm-type samples for each country which leaves us with 83farm-type 
country samples, with sufficient number of observations to apply our estimation algorithm. The 
estimated samples account for about 85 per cent of the FADN EU-15 farms.  
- Table 1 here - 
Summary statistics for the regression variables are reported in Table 1 and detailed 
definitions based on the FADN (2010) codebook are presented in an on-line Appendix 1. The 
summary statistics show substantial heterogeneity of (average) farms across the EU-15. There is 
some evidence of a North-South divide but with several exceptions when various indicators are 
considered. In Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark farms are more capital intensive (have 
higher capital/labour ratio) and invest more; these farms are also the largest in terms of output. 
Not too different from this group of countries is Italy where farms are also relatively large in 
terms of capital and investment but less so in terms of output. The Greek and Portuguese farms 
are the least capital intensive, invest the least and are the smallest in terms of output. Farm 
employment varies less compared to capital across the EU-15 countries with farms in the 
Netherlands, the UK and Germany appearing the largest in terms of labour employed.  
There is even more pronounced North-South differentiation between the Member States 
when average subsidies per farm are considered, which is largely determined by the differences 
in farm size. For north European countries average farm subsidies range roughly between 
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 For Austria, Finland and Sweden which joined the EU in 1995 the period of analysis is 1995-2008. 
17
 The six farm types comprise field crop farms, horticultural and vine farms, specialised dairy farms, other grazing 
livestock farms, poultry and pig meat farms, and mixed farms. 
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€16,000 and €35,000 (the highest subsidies being paid to Finish farms) while for south European 
countries subsidies are around or less than €8,000 per farm. This relationship holds also for 
subsidy per unit of labour employed. However, when subsidy per unit of capital is considered the 
picture is the opposite – south European farms are more heavily subsidised.  
- Table 2 here - 
In Table 2 the production function coefficients estimated from the 83samplesare presented 
for each EU-15 Member State by aggregating over farm types using output shares as weights (an 
on-line Appendix 2 reports the coefficients by farm type). There is substantial variation across 
countries as the materials coefficient ranges between 0.59 for Greece and 0.87 for Sweden; the 
labour coefficient ranges between 0.07 for Ireland and 0.26 for Spain and Denmark; and the 
capital coefficient is between 0.05 for Ireland and 0.12 for Austria. Farms in most, especially 
north European, countries exhibit constant or increasing returns to scale, while the farms in 
Greece and Italy are characterised by slightly decreasing returns. The (aggregated) Adjusted R
2
 
from the second stage of the estimation algorithm is high, above 0.90 for every country set of 
regressions suggesting high goodness of fit.
18
 
In the last column (6) of Table 2, both a productivity index (relative level) and a growth 
rate are reported for each EU-15 country. These two aggregate productivity measures (TFP index 
and TFP growth) are weighted averages of farm-level productivity measures using output shares 
as weights, within and between farm types, thus capturing the farm and sector composition 
effects. As explained by Van Biesebroeck (2008) productivity is intrinsically a relative concept. 
                                                          
18
 We carry out several econometric tests at the first and the second stage of our estimation algorithm. At the first 
stage, we run Wald tests for the joint significance of all the polynomial terms and reject the null of no difference 
from zero at 1 percent level in all regressions. Second, Ramsey specification-error tests for omitted variables were 
run and the null that the models had no omitted variables was not rejected at conventional levels in any regression. 
Third, Breusch-Pagan tests for heteroskedasticity of the errors were run and the null of constant variance was not 
rejected at conventional levels in any regression. Forth, Breusch-Godfrey tests for first- and second-order serial 
correlation in the errors were also run and the null of no serial correlation was not rejected at conventional levels in 
any regression. Finally, as in Olley and Pakes (1996) we conducted Hausman tests to investigate the differences 
between the standard OLS and FE coefficient estimates and those obtained from our estimation algorithm. The χ2 
statistics rejected the nulls that any of the OLS or FE models were correct at 5 percent level in all samples.  
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Therefore, for comparative purposes, within each EU-15 country, we define our farm productivy 
measure in (relative) levels following Olley and Pakes (1996) as 
tjtjt tfptfpTFP / , where ttfp  is 
the average productivity of all farms in period t; the farm productivity growth is defined as 
)/log( 1 jtjtjt tfptfptfp .  
The TFP index )( jtTFP ranges between 0.73 in Greece and 1.67 in Finland; a higher index 
suggests that relatively more productive farms and farm sectors dominate, i.e., they have larger 
market shares. Overall, by this measure, the north European countries appear to have more 
productive farm sectors. The comparison of the TFP growth )( jttfp measures is interesting; 
average annual growth ranges between -0.78% in Finland and +2.05% in Italy. Six small, north 
European countries show negative productivity growth while the three largest EU-15 countries, 
Germany, France and the UK all show small but positive productivity growth. The highest 
average annual productivity growth is recorded by the south European countries, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain.  
 
5 The subsidies and productivity link: A correlation analysis 
Our goal in this section is to test the link between subsidies and farm productivity. Subsidies are 
widely used in the EU agriculture and the large majority of farms have received subsidies in one 
way or another. Thus, we do not have an easy way to identify treatment and control groups. 
Furthermore, we are interested here in the link between subsidies and productivity at the 
aggregate (country) level. Therefore, we test the relationship by the means of correlation analysis 
using the same FADN country samples that we used to estimate farm productivity (tfpjt). We note 
that this verification analysis is different from the two-stage analysis in previous productivity 
studies because in our productivity estimation algorithm we have already explicitly accounted for 
18 
 
the effects of subsidies. Thus, to demonstrate the link between subsidies and our productivity 
measure it is sufficient to use a simple nonparametric correlation analysis.
19
 
Spearman (rank) correlation coefficient or Spearman’s ρ is a nonparametric measure of 
statistical dependence between two variables. It assesses how well the relationship between two 
variables can be described using a monotonic function. If there are no repeated data values, a 
perfect Spearman correlation of +1 or −1 occurs when each of the variables is a perfect monotone 
function of the other. The Spearman correlation coefficient is often described as being 
“nonparametric” because compared with the Pearson correlation, which only gives a perfect 
correlation when two variables X and Y are related by a linear function, a perfect Spearman 
correlation results when X and Y are related by any (unrestricted) monotonic function. 
Furthermore, Spearman correlation exact sampling distribution can be obtained without requiring 
knowledge of the parameters of the joint probability distribution of X and Y. The sign of the 
Spearman correlation indicates the direction of association between X and Y. A Spearman 
correlation of zero indicates that there is no tendency for Y to either increase or decrease when X 
increases. The Spearman correlation increases in magnitude as X and Y become closer to being 
perfect monotone functions of each other.  
- Table 3a here – 
- Table 3b here – 
In Table 3a we report results from the correlation analyses for the full samples, by country, 
before and after decoupling was introduced. In Table 3b we report analogous results but for 
subsamples where farms receive only coupled subsidies, which were most severely affected by 
the policy change (e.g., crop area payments, animal payments). That is we drop from the sample 
farms that received other type of coupled subsidies which were not subject to decoupling and 
included mainly rural development payments (e.g., agri-environmental payments, investment 
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 We also carried out multivariate regression analysis on the link between subsidies and productivity using 
specification based on the productivity function (Equation (4)), by country. The results of this conditional analysis 
are consistent with the unconditional correlation analysis results reported in the paper, and are available on request.  
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payments, LFA payments). The share of farms that remained for the analysis of the subsamples 
varies between 76 percent in Greece and 43 percent in Sweden. We expect that the effect of 
decoupling will be stronger in this subsample because we eliminate the potential impact that other 
coupled subsidies (those not directly affected by decoupling) may have on the farm productivity. 
Other coupled subsidies may bias upward or downward the estimated impact of subsidy 
decoupling on productivity as they may either increase (e.g., investment payments) or reduce 
(e.g., agri-environmental payments) productivity.  
Based both on the full samples and the subsamples, we find clear evidence that the link 
between subsidies and the level of productivity (tfpjt) before decoupling is negative even though 
the magnitude of the correlation coefficients varies substantially across countries; often 
coefficients are quite small but nevertheless the correlations are highly statistically significant. 
Exceptions are Denmark and Portugal where productivity shows consistently positive correlation 
with subsidies. In terms of productivity growth )( jttfp  the correlation is also negative for 
majority of countries as for only four countries it is positive but not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. These results are consistent with findings by previous productivity studies 
which employ two-stage approaches to identify the CAP subsidy impact on farm technical 
efficiency (e.g., Latruffe et al., 2009; Lakner, 2009; Zhu and Oude Lansink, 2010, Mary, 2012). 
Considering the full sample results reported in Table 3a, for the period after decoupled 
subsidies were introduced the relationship between subsidies and farm productivity appears more 
diverse as for all countries with significant correlations the coefficients became less negative. 
Furthermore, besides for Denmark and Portugal, the correlation became (weakly) positive for 
three more countries – Austria, Finland and Sweden. Importantly, the correlation of subsidies 
with productivity growth has changed dramatically. For majority of countries the correlation 
coefficients turned positive as they are significant at the 5 percent level for nine countries. Only 
for Greece the coefficient remained negative but not statistically significant. Interestingly, the 
20 
 
group of countries for which a switch of the correlation sign occurred, from negative to positive, 
after decoupling is mixed, including both north and south European Member States.  
When considering the subsample results reported in Table 3b the most important 
observation is that the magnitudes of change following subsidy decoupling are larger compared 
to those in the full samples. Furthermore, productivity growth rates and subsidies are positively 
correlated in every country after the decoupling policy was introduced. The effects in the 
subsamples compared to the full samples clearly suggest that indeed decoupling had an impact on 
productivity. Our findings are consistent with Zhu et al. (2012) and Mary (2012),neither of which 
investigate the fully decoupled payments but consider the impact of partial decupling (e.g., the 
introduction of the Agenda 2000). The former study finds that a higher degree of coupling in 
farm support negatively affects farm efficiency, whereas the latter study finds that the Agenda 
2000 reform had a positive impact on productivity. 
Clearly the link between productivity and subsidies depends on their type. Our results 
provide (indirect) evidence that coupled subsidies indeed distort farm behaviour (e.g., production 
structure and/or input allocation) leading to productivity loss. Furthermore, due to the allocative 
and technical inefficiencies, monitoring costs and payment uncertainty, coupled subsidies are 
expected to stimulate less credit and hence also enhance less productive investment compared to 
decoupled payments. Also note that a significant part of coupled payments could be leaked away 
to other agents through changes in market prices; the effect diminishes farms’ benefits from 
subsidies. The leakage is positively correlated with coupling because it implies stronger link of 
subsidies to farm activities and thus stronger impact on the aggregate price level (Floyd, 1965; 
Alston and James, 2002). 
Compared to coupled subsidies, the results indicate that in countries where positive 
effects are observed, decoupled subsidies may impact farm productivity through the “credit 
channel”. Subsidies allow farms to improve their credit position and/or reduce cost of borrowing 
for investments thus, boosting their productivity. Furthermore, the observed positive effect could 
21 
 
also be due to subsidies decreasing risk aversion which ensures that the farm productivity 
adjustment is stronger as farmers may be more willing to expand capital and adopt novel 
technologies. For the cases where insignificant or a negative effect of subsidies after decoupling 
is still observed, this could be due to either insignificant market imperfections (credit problems) 
in the agricultural sector (e.g., Sweden) or partial decoupling
20
 (e.g., Greece) or the combination 
of the two factors. For example, if farm credit problems are insignificant, there is minor or no 
gain from subsidies through the credit channel.
21
 Partial decoupling means that a share of 
subsidies is kept coupled with the introduction of decoupled payments in 2005/2006 which may 
lead to efficiency losses due to persistence of production distortions offsetting partly or fully the 
gains from alleviation of market imperfections (i.e., the investment-induced productivity gains). 
 
6 Summary and conclusions 
The focus of the paper is on evaluating the link between CAP subsidies and total factor 
productivity of the EU commercial farms. The paper also documents aggregate productivity 
differences across the EU Member States and FADN farm types (sectors) using micro data. We 
build a structural model of the unobserved productivity incorporating directly the effects of farm 
subsidies and adapt the semi-parametric estimation algorithm proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) 
to estimate the parameters of production functions within the FADN farm-type samples, for each 
of the EU-15 countries, and for the period 1990/1995– 2008. We control for differences in the 
economic environment across narrowly defined spatial units and model productivity as a non-
parametric function of investment and state variables, including as additional control farm 
subsidies which greatly enhances our ability to obtain consistent estimates of the production 
function parameters and thus, back out unbiased TFP measures at farm level.  
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With the introduction of the decoupled payments, countries could still allocate part of the total subsidy envelope to 
coupled payments such as arable crop payments, sheep and goat payments, suckle cow premium, etc. (EUR-Lex, 
2003). Examples of countries which maintained a significant level of coupled payments include Austria, France, 
Greece, Italy, and Portugal. 
21
 Other factor (land and labour) market imperfections might also affect both the level and rate of change of 
productivity.  
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We aggregate farm productivity measures by country and farm type and find some 
evidence that aggregate productivity level and growth systematically differ between the north and 
south European country sets. Our correlation analysis, for each of the EU-15 countries, clearly 
demonstrates the link between CAP subsidies and farm total factor productivity. We find negative 
correlation between subsidies and farm productivity in the period before the decoupling reform 
was implemented; after decoupling, in 2005/2006, the correlation between subsidies and 
productivity is more nuanced as in several countries it turned positive. Theoretically the link 
between subsidies and productivity is determined by the net effect of allocative and technical 
efficiency losses and the investment-induced productivity gains caused by the interaction of 
market imperfections with subsidy. We do not identify the two effects separately; we can only 
infer their relative importance from the net effect. A caveat we need to acknowledge is that our 
results are based on the EU-15 samples which consist of the more developed economies in 
Europe where market failures are less pronounced. The results might be different for the samples 
of the less developed new Member States where ceteris paribus the credit alleviation effect of 
subsidies might be stronger. 
Our findings are consistent with the literature emphasising the inefficiencies of public 
subsidisation of production and at the same time lend support to the EU policy for decoupling of 
CAP subsidies. The results suggest that the decoupled payments are less distortive and enhance 
productivity which is consistent with the WTO agenda. From the food security perspective the 
evidence indicates possible improvement in future food availability through increasing productive 
capacity of EU agricultural sector. The 2011 European Commission proposal for the post-2013 
CAP suggests maintaining the decoupled subsidies system after 2013 which would likely ensure 
continued future enhancement of EU farm productivity. Our analyses suggest that the positive 
productivity effect of subsidy decoupling could be induced by correcting for inefficiencies in the 
agricultural sector. However, one should be careful in drawing conclusions regarding general 
23 
 
welfare implications from this, since the analysis do not account for distortions of taxation 
funding the subsidy. 
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Table 1 Summary statistics 
 
Country Investment 
(s.d.) 
Capital 
(s.d.) 
Labour 
(s.d.) 
Materials 
(s.d.) 
Output
 
(s.d.)
 
Subsidies 
(s.d.) 
Exits 
(No.obs.) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Belgium 43.7 
(282.5) 
881.9 
(686.8) 
5131 
(2618) 
76.3 
(67.4) 
141.0 
(106.3) 
23.0 
(14.8) 
0.14 
(14482) 
Denmark 112.8 
(526.6) 
1429.5 
(1763.7) 
4932 
(4713) 
201.6 
(208.2) 
327.3 
(332.1) 
27.0 
(28.5) 
0.26 
(17543) 
Germany 84.1 
(2497.1) 
1841.1 
(5461.1) 
5336 
(7990) 
113.4 
(199.7) 
172.4 
(285.9) 
31.2 
(78.3) 
0.12 
(74777) 
Greece 3.0 
(43.9) 
173.9 
(115.4) 
4301 
(2518) 
14.8 
(13.0) 
38.2 
(22.4) 
7.1 
(10.5) 
0.20 
(17883) 
Spain 32.8 
(1251.6) 
304.7 
(2188.1) 
3399 
(1776) 
29.3 
(39.5) 
60.3 
(57.9) 
8.2 
(11.9) 
0.15 
(58502) 
France 58.5 
(587.1) 
658.8 
(1220.8) 
3821 
(2533) 
67.7 
(52.9) 
117.2 
(91.4) 
21.5 
(22.0) 
0.13 
(93420) 
Ireland 49.6 
(240.3) 
817.6 
(649.8) 
3711 
(1361) 
42.9 
(25.3) 
73.1 
(46.3) 
16.2 
(14.9) 
0.16 
(8230) 
Italy 57.0 
(950.7) 
901.1 
(1735.9) 
4701 
(2805) 
30.9 
(41.7) 
73.1 
(84.2) 
7.9 
(53.7) 
0.29 
(99433) 
Luxembourg 26.7 
(145.6) 
1047.6 
(471.1) 
3697 
(1260) 
69.5 
(36.8) 
117.0 
(56.3) 
31.8 
(22.7) 
0.08 
(4807) 
Netherlands 111.1 
(765.3) 
1588.7 
(1700.5) 
6358 
(6191) 
182.2 
(206.8) 
314.9 
(326.5) 
16.7 
(24.2) 
0.17 
(17290) 
Austria 16.1 
(63.6) 
370.6 
(190.5) 
4178 
(1499) 
33.6 
(19.6) 
63.6 
(32.7) 
19.6 
(11.9) 
0.06 
(17248) 
Portugal 3.6 
(56.2) 
152.4 
(119.9) 
5176 
(2826) 
30.1 
(27.5) 
49.2 
(37.3) 
8.3 
(17.1) 
0.21 
(12343) 
Finland 13.4 
(64.5) 
322.4 
(219.1) 
4577 
(2450) 
67.0 
(50.1) 
83.0 
(70.1) 
34.7 
(24.8) 
0.10 
(7176) 
Sweden 55.1 
(424.3) 
818.4 
(832.4) 
3725 
(1750) 
98.1 
(75.0) 
132.1 
(111.0) 
28.3 
(26.8) 
0.11 
(6645) 
UK 33.5 
(299.6) 
990.3 
(781.2) 
5488 
(3687) 
95.1 
(82.2) 
142.4 
(132.3) 
31.6 
(32.1) 
0.17 
(38405) 
Notes: Mean and standard deviation (s.d.) are reported for each variable. All monetary variables are measured in 
2000 (thousands of) Euros. Labour is measured in total full-time equivalent hours worked annually The average 
annual exit rate (Exits) capture farms exiting the sample both because of exiting production and because of the 
sampling rules. Total number of observations (No.obs.) is also reported.  
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Table 2 Production function coefficients and productivity estimates 
 
Country 
m  
(s.e.) 
l  
(s.e.) 
k  
(s.e.) 
Adj.R
2 
(No.obs.)
 
TFP index 
(TFP growth) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Belgium 0.68 
(0.03) 
0.24 
(0.04) 
0.08 
(0.02) 
0.98 
(10693) 
1.10 
(-0.63) 
Denmark 0.72 
(0.02) 
0.26 
(0.02) 
0.08 
(0.02) 
0.97 
(10697) 
1.02 
(-0.06) 
Germany 0.84 
(0.01) 
0.17 
(0.01) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
0.93 
(54037) 
1.05 
(+0.63) 
Greece 0.59 
(0.02) 
0.22 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.02) 
0.99 
(11957) 
0.73 
(+0.43) 
Spain 0.60 
(0.01) 
0.26 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(32121) 
1.09 
(+1.98) 
France 0.74 
(0.01) 
0.21 
(0.01) 
0.08 
(0.01) 
0.97 
(71274) 
1.01 
(+0.24) 
Ireland 0.80 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.02) 
0.98 
(6088) 
1.23 
(-0.59) 
Italy 0.62 
(0.01) 
0.20 
(0.01) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(56977) 
1.10 
(+2.05) 
Luxembourg 0.68 
(0.03) 
0.24 
(0.03) 
0.10 
(0.02) 
0.99 
(3799) 
0.99 
(+0.63) 
Netherlands 0.70 
(0.01) 
0.27 
(0.02) 
0.11 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(12800) 
1.04 
(-0.61) 
Austria 0.62 
(0.02) 
0.20 
(0.02) 
0.12 
(0.02) 
0.99 
(13228) 
1.36 
(+1.44) 
Portugal 0.64 
(0.02) 
0.20 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
0.97 
(8341) 
0.96 
(+1.89) 
Finland 0.68 
(0.03) 
0.16 
(0.02) 
0.11 
(0.02) 
0.93 
(5364) 
1.67 
(-0.78) 
Sweden 0.87 
(0.03) 
0.11 
(0.02) 
0.06 
(0.01) 
0.95 
(4626) 
1.20 
(-0.47) 
UK 0.80 
(0.01) 
0.22 
(0.02) 
0.08 
(0.01) 
0.94 
(27680) 
0.99 
(+0.18) 
Notes: TFP index is an aggregate productivity measure in relative levels; TFP growth is the aggregate annual 
percentage change. Aggregated production function coefficients and Adj.R
2
 are reported. Total number of 
observations (No.obs.) reported is from the second-step estimated samples.  
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Table 3a Correlation between subsidies and productivity, full samples 
 
Country TFP index TFP growth 
Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Belgium -0.272 
(0.000) 
-0.250 
(0.000) 
-0.015 
(0.024) 
+0.024 
(0.032) 
Denmark +0.160 
(0.000) 
+0.206 
(0.000) 
+0.018 
(0.087) 
+0.024 
(0.055) 
Germany -0.526 
(0.000) 
-0.477 
(0.000) 
+0.014 
(0.079) 
+0.027 
(0.000) 
Greece -0.068 
(0.000) 
-0.034 
(0.000) 
-0.081 
(0.000) 
-0.015 
(0.183) 
Spain -0.471 
(0.000) 
-0.402 
(0.000) 
-0.022 
(0.000) 
+0.022 
(0.028) 
France -0.539 
(0.000) 
-0.507 
(0.000) 
-0.027 
(0.000) 
+0.013 
(0.000) 
Ireland -0.502 
(0.000) 
-0.278 
(0.000) 
-0.029 
(0.059) 
+0.025 
(0.041) 
Italy -0.324 
(0.000) 
-0.304 
(0.000) 
+0.013 
(0.129) 
+0.026 
(0.000) 
Luxembourg -0.175 
(0.000) 
-0.032 
(0.246) 
-0.047 
(0.001) 
+0.057 
(0.059) 
Netherlands -0.648 
(0.000) 
-0.504 
(0.000) 
-0.015 
(0.143) 
+0.018 
(0.375) 
Austria -0.060 
(0.000) 
+0.080 
(0.000) 
-0.022 
(0.045) 
+0.028 
(0.063) 
Portugal +0.253 
(0.000) 
+0.266 
(0.000) 
-0.047 
(0.002) 
+0.001 
(0.063) 
Finland -0.162 
(0.000) 
+0.049 
(0.023) 
+0.003 
(0.868) 
+0.070 
(0.004) 
Sweden -0.222 
(0.000) 
+0.006 
(0.766) 
-0.011 
(0.572) 
+0.016 
(0.500) 
UK -0.337 
(0.000) 
-0.206 
(0.000) 
-0.038 
(0.000) 
+0.041 
(0.001) 
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients are reported. In parentheses below each coefficient reported is Prob > 
|t| for the test of the null: subsidies and productivity are independent. 
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Table 3b Correlation between subsidies and productivity, decoupling subsamples 
 
Country TFP index TFP growth 
Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Belgium -0.294 
(0.000) 
+0.063 
(0.011) 
-0.031 
(0.106) 
+0.076 
(0.010) 
Denmark +0.167 
(0.000) 
+0.251 
(0.000) 
-0.016 
(0.181) 
+0.049 
(0.019) 
Germany -0.592 
(0.000) 
-0.447 
(0.000) 
-0.031 
(0.000) 
+0.037 
(0.017) 
Greece -0.081 
(0.000) 
+0.055 
(0.107) 
-0.128 
(0.002) 
+0.017 
(0.107) 
Spain -0.482 
(0.000) 
-0.144 
(0.000) 
-0.026 
(0.015) 
+0.024 
(0.028) 
France -0.565 
(0.000) 
+0.010 
(0.135) 
-0.034 
(0.000) 
+0.051 
(0.019) 
Ireland -0.542 
(0.000) 
-0.153 
(0.005) 
-0.031 
(0.022) 
+0.030 
(0.061) 
Italy -0.337 
(0.000) 
-0.258 
(0.000) 
-0.008 
(0.302) 
+0.028 
(0.000) 
Luxembourg -0.186 
(0.087) 
+0.069 
(0.055) 
-0.111 
(0.012) 
+0.068 
(0.032) 
Netherlands -0.654 
(0.000) 
-0.324 
(0.000) 
-0.026 
(0.038) 
+0.020 
(0.093) 
Austria -0.108 
(0.000) 
+0.178 
(0.030) 
-0.028 
(0.022) 
+0.048 
(0.056) 
Portugal +0.225 
(0.000) 
+0.290 
(0.000) 
-0.041 
(0.009) 
+0.100 
(0.062) 
Finland -0.238 
(0.000) 
+0.111 
(0.041) 
-0.005 
(0.370) 
+0.032 
(0.051) 
Sweden -0.247 
(0.000) 
+0.191 
(0.016) 
-0.032 
(0.139) 
+0.035 
(0.472) 
UK -0.372 
(0.000) 
-0.180 
(0.000) 
-0.055 
(0.072) 
+0.067 
(0.018) 
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients are reported. In parentheses below each coefficient reported is Prob > 
|t| for the test of the null: subsidies and productivity are independent. 
 
